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Incentive Compatible Trade Policies
ABSTRACT
We consider a two country trade model with production uncertainty.If
complete contingent markets do not exist, it is desirable for governments to
adopt some trade policies to share the production risk. A full information
policy involves income transfers across countries, which can be achieved by
equal import tariffs and export subsidies. With incomplete information we
consider incentive compatible trade policies, which are designed to be truth
revealing while partially sharing the production risk.In this case the






Under international trade laws, the application of import restrictions
often depends on some special conditions in the trading industry. For example,
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), known as the
"escape clause" provision, states that a tariff concession (reduction) can be
withdrawn if "any product is being imported...in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products" (Sec.
1.(a)). In this case the special conditions are that imports have increased
and that the domestic industry faces actual or potential injury (as often
measured by unemployment or excess capacity). Similiar provisions are made in
section 201 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.
The conditional feature of these trade laws is meant to limit their range
of application. However, such a limitation may be ineffective when one
country cannot actually verify the conditions faced by an industry in the
other country.Indeed, under this scenario of incomplete information, each
country may be tempted to misrepresent the conditions faced by their own
industries and thereby obtain import protection. We feel that the assumption
of incomplete information is useful in analysing trade negotiations between
countries.In this paper we shall consider the design of socially optimal
trade policies under incomplete information.
In section II we outline a two good, two country trade model with
production uncertainty at home. A social optimum in this model will generally
require a set of contingent commodity markets, with goods sold contingent on
the state of nature.In reality an equivalent set of contingent commodity
markets may not exist, but we argue in section III that the social optimum can
be still be achieved by income transfers across countries.These income—2—
transfers can occur through a tariff in one country combined with an equal
export subsidy in the other.These trade policies support the first—best
equilibrium, but are contingent on the state of nature at home.
In section IV we analyse whether the home country has any incentive to
falsely announce the state of nature, and we find that it may wish to do so.
This means that the full information trade policies described above are not
incentive compatible, that is, they do not lead to a true revelation of the
state of nature.Accordingly, in section V we consider second—best trade
policies which maximize world welfare subject to the constraint of being
incentive compatible. We find that these trade policies may involve a tariff
in one country which differs from the export subsidy abroad, so that consumer
prices are not equalized internationally.This distortion is optimal given
incomplete information.Directions for further research are discussed in
section VI.
Our paper is related to those of Eaton and Grossman (1984) and Staiger
and Tabelllni (1986) by examining trade policy under uncertainty. In contrast
to these papers, the markets which are assumed to be absent are international
rather than domestic.The application of incentive compatibility to trade
policy appears to be new, though it has received substantial attention in the
implicit contracts literature, recently surveyed by Holmstrom and Hart (1985)
and Rosen (1985).The reader is also referred to the papers in the 1983
Supplement to the Quarterly Journal of Economics, especially Azariadis (1983).
II. Equilibrium with Complete Markets
We shall consider a two good, two country model with production uncer-
tainty at home. We assume that consumers are identical within countries, with
each population then set at unity, but allow for different degrees of risk—3—
aversion across countries. With the additional assumption that preferences
are homothetic, we write the utility function for the home consumer as U[g(x)]
where x =(x1,x2)is the consumption vector; we assume that g is homogeneous
of degree one, concave and increasing in x, with U > 0, Ut, (0.The function
g summarizes the indifference curves of the home consumer, while the concavity
of U determines the degree of risk aversion. We suppose that the foreign
consumer has the same indifference curves as at home, but may differ in risk
aversion, and write the foreign utility function as U*[g(x*)] with U > 0 and
U*'t0.
We let s =a,bdenote the two states of nature at home, with the feasible
output vector y =(y1,y2)satisfying f(y,s)0.1 We suppose that the set of
feasible outputs is convex and that production decisions are made ex—post.2
Let z =(z1,z2)denote imports into the home country. Then we can summarize
the utility obtained through trading opportunities at home using the trade
utility function, defined as:
h(z,s) g(x) subject to f(x—z,s)0 . (1)
Note that the trade utility function h(z,s) is measured in the same units
as g(x). The actual utility obtained by the home consumer is U[h(z,s)]. From
the first order conditions for (1) we see that the partial derivatives of h
and g are equal, h(z,s) =g(x).An analogous trade utility function denoted
by h*(z*) holds for the foreign country, where the production set f*(y*)0
is not subject to uncertainty. This function is measured in the same units as
g(x*) and actual foreign utility is U*[h*(z*)]. We also have that h(z*) =
g(x*).—4—
We can now state the equilibrium conditions for the economies under free
trade. We first consider the case of complete contingent commodity markets,
with prices p =(p18,p25)depending on the state of nature s =a,b.
Purchasing good 1 in state a means that the good is delivered only if state a
occurs, while the payment 1a is made regardless of the state.Using the
condition of balanced trade the home consumer faces the budget constraint
pz5 =0,where imports z =(z15,z25)are also contingent on the state of
nature, and all vectors are treated as columns unless transposed using a
prime.
Let denote the probability of state s occurring, s =a,b.Then the
home consumer solves the problem:
max 5U[h(z5,s)] subject topz5 =0, (2)
with the first order conditions,
=
Ap5 ,s=a,b. (3)
The foreign consumer solves a problem analogous to (2), facing thesame price
vector p5 under free trade. The first order conditions are:
=A*p ,s=a,b, (4)
where —z =zsince home exports are foreign imports.
From (3) and (4) it is immediate that the marginal rates of substitution
between goods are equal in the two countries.This equality holds when we
compute (A) the ratio of marginal utilities from goods 1 and 2 in a given
state, or (B) the ratio of marginal utilities from good i in states a and b.—5—
In contrast, the free trade equilibrium which would occur under spot markets
would only satisfy equality of (A) across countries. We illustrate the spot
and contingent market equilibria in Figure 1.
In Figure 1 OF* is the foreign offer curve, while OFa and OFb are the
home offer curves in the two states of nature.In the case we have shown the
home country desires to trade less at any price ratio in state a, which can
occur if state a has higher productivity in the home import industry.The
spot market equilibria would be A0 in state a and B0 in state b. At each of
these equilibrium the trade balance is zero. However, with complete contin-
gent markets the trade balance need not be zero within each state: from the
constraint in (2) trade is balanced only when summing across all states. For
example, if PZa < 0 then the home country has a trade surplus in state a, but
an equal trade deficit in state b.The use of contingent contracts permits
implicit income transfers across countries, which are a means of sharing risk
and raising expected utility.
In general, the following condition holds in the first—best equilibrium,
obtained with complete markets:3
U[h(za,a)1/U[h(zb,b)] =U*[h*(za)]/U*[h*(_Zb)]
. (5)
Condition (5) corresponds to optimal risk sharing.It implies that the
marginal utilities of the countries are perfectly correlated, and therefore,
the utility levels of the countries are positively correlated across states.
We shall use this result repeatedly.
Several examples can illustrate the direction of income transfer.
Suppose that state a has higher productivity in the import industry at home,
as in Figure 1. Then the home consumer has higher utility in state a than in
b (with higher output and a positive terms of trade effect) while the foreign—6—
consumer has lower utility (due to a negative terms of trade effect).To
satisfy (5) the home consumer would give an income transfer in state a and
receive it in b.This would move the equilibrium in state a along a contract
curve towards A1 or A2 in Figure 1.In state b the equilibrium would move
towards B1 or B2.
Alternatively, suppose that state a has higher productivity in the export
industry at home (not drawn).There are two possibilities.First, if the
home country experiences inimiserizing growth then it is worse off in state a,
while the foreign country is better off (due to a positive terms of trade
effect). To satisfy (5) the home country would receive an income transfer in
state a and give it in b.Second, if the home country does not experience
immiserizing growth in state a then both countries are better off, and the
direction of income transfer will depend on the relative degrees of risk
aversion.It is possible that (5) could hold by coincidence in the spot
market equilibrium, so the optimal transfer would be zero.
In the complete markets equilibria at least one country must be better
off than with spot markets, even after compensating the other country for any
drop in utility. Under the special assumptions we have made on preferences,
however, we obtain a stronger result:so long as (5) does not with spot
markets, then both countries are better off under complete contingent markets.
This follows from the assumption that consumers in the two countries have the
same indifference curves, so that any income transfer has no effect on equi-
librium prices. Thus, the price ratio Pls'P2s faced by consumers under spot
or contingent markets are identical, but with spot markets consumers face the
additional constraint that trade must be balanced within each state. There-
fore, utility in each country must be lower if only spot markets are
available.—7—
III. Full Information Trade Policies
Contingent contracts for commodities are a claim to future output. In
some cases stock markets may serve the same role, as in Helpman and Razin
(1978) who obtain the complete markets equilibrium using stocks.4 However,
there are several reasons why markets for claims to future output may by
imperfect or absent.In our international setting, consumers in one country
may lack the information needed to make fully diversified stock purchases
abroad. More generally, a firm which has has sold claims to all of it future
output may lack an incentive to produce efficiently —thisis a moral hazard
problem, often cited as an explanation for missing insurance markets.
Henceforth, we shall suppose that only spot markets for commodities are
available, and investigate government trade policies to improve welfare.
These policies will take the form of international rules on the application of
tariffs and subsidies, as could be negotiated in a GATT forum.The highest
goal for the policies would be to restore welfare to the first—best, complete
markets equilibrium, which in our model would give both countries higher
utility than with spot markets.
If both governments can observe the state of nature at home then trade
policies can be made contingent on the true state.Then the first—best
equilibrium can be restored by a system of import tariffs and equal export
subsidies abroad.The revenue collected from the tariff and lost by the
subsidy is a means of achieving the income transfers discussed in section II
(alternatively, explicit transfers could be used).For example, if state b
has lower productivity in the import industry at home, the home country would
set an Import tariff matched by an equal subsidy abroad. The level of tariff
and subsidy would be chosen to exactly achieve the income transfer obtained in
the complete markets equilibrium.Note that consumer prices would be equa-
lized across countries since the tariff and subsidy are equal. In state a the—8—
foreign country would set an import tariff matched by an equal subsidy at
home, to achieve the reverse income transfer.
It is useful to compare the tariff revenue collected in one state with
that lost in the other.In the contingent market equilibrium we have Pa =
pbzbwhich is not generally zero, reflecting the income transfer. Using (3)
we can compute the corresponding spot market prices as E Uh(z5,s)/A =
sothat = Thenfrom the budget constraint in (2),
irPz =0 . (6)
The term Pz5 is the trade balance evaluated at international spot prices,
which equals the revenue collected or lost in that state.Condition (6)
states that tariff revenue weighted by the expected frequency of each state
must sum to zero. Thus, a country which uses a tariff in one state of nature
will have commensurate tariffs levied against it in other states, as measured
by the corresponding revenues.5
IV. Incentive Compatibility
We next consider the case where the foreign government cannot observe
that state of nature at home. Then the home government can choose to announce
that either state has occurred. A policy in which the home government has no
incentive to falsely announce the state is referred to as incentive
tible, and must satisfy the following constraints:
UEh(za,a)1 ) U[h(zb,a)] , (7a)
U[h(zb,b)] ) UEh(za,b)1 . (7b)
Constraint (7a) states that when the true state of nature is a, the home—9—
country would prefer to announce that a has occurred and receive the trade
bundle Za rather than announcing b and receiving zb. Conversely, (7b) ensures
that when the true state of nature is b the home country has not incentive to
announce that state a has occurred.
We need to determine whether either of the constraints (7) are violated
in the first—best equilibrium.First, consider the special case where the
home consumer is risk neutral, so that U is a constant. Then from (5) we see
that U* will be equal in the two states, which implies that foreign utility
U is equal across states. This equilibrium is shown as A1, B1 in Figure 1,
with the foreign consumer receiving constant utility of U*.The home
consumer, who is risk neutral, has absorbed all of the fluctuation in
utility.In this case we can see that the first—best equilibrium satisfies
(7):when the true state of nature is a, the home consumer obtains highest
utility at A1 where a home trade—indifference curve is tangent to U* (as
drawn), and similiarly when the true state is b.Note that this result does
not depend on which industry at home is affected by the uncertainty. Whenever
the home consumer is risk neutral, the equilibrium obtained with full
information trade policy is incentive compatible.6
Now suppose that the home country is risk averse, with U" < 0.Label
states of nature so that state a has the higher productivity at home (in
either industry).7 Then from (5) both countries will have higher utility in
state a under complete markets. In Figure 1, as the home country becomes more
risk averse the equilibrium must move from A1 towards A2, raising foreign
welfare in state a, and from B1 towards B2 lowering welfare. This will ensure
that the foreign country has higher utility in state a than b, with the same
condition holding at home.
Suppose that the home country is sufficiently risk averse to move the
equilibria to A2, B2. If state a occurs then the home country receives— 10—
utilityUa from the trade bundle A2, as shown by the trade—indifference curve,
but would receive higher utility from the trade bundle B2 (a higher trade—
indifference curve, not drawn, would pass through B2). Thus, the home country
would prefer to falsely announce that state b has occurred, violating con-
straint (7a).On the other hand, if state b occurs the home country would
have no incentive to announce otherwise (compare B2 with A2), so constraint
(7b) is always satisfied. In general, given our labelling of states, the only
constraint which can be violated with the full information trade policy is
(7a).8 Henceforth we shall consider only this contraint.
V. Incentive Compatible Trade Policies
In this section we shall construct second—best trade policies which
maximize welfare subject to the constraint (7a). Under such policies the home






U[h(za,a)] > U[h(zb,a)] , (8)
U'
S
The first constraint in (8) is repeated from (7a), while the second constraint
puts a lower bound on expected utility abroad. Note that if the constraint
(7a) were omitted then the solution to (8) would be a Pareto optimum, and for
suitable choice of U* would yield the first—best equilibrium.— 11—
Forminga Lagrangian with 0 0 as the multiplier for the first







From (9a) it is immediate that marginal rates of substitution are equal across
countries when state a (the good state) occurs. However, when state b occurs
the marginal rates of substitution may not be equalized. Condition (9b) can
be rewritten as,






where D has the same sign as 0:D =0if (7a) is not binding and D > 0
otherwise. The relation between the marginal rates of substitution across
countries depends on the right—most expression in square brackets in (10). We
shall now determine the sign of this expression.
Suppose that good 1 is exported by the home country, and consider Figure
2. We show the home consumption and production points in state b as Xb and
b' respectively, with imports as the difference between them. Note that the
consumption and production points are chosen to maximize utility for the given
import vector zb =Xb
—b'as in (1).The expansion path corresponding to
domestic prices in state b is OE, and a parallel line YbE is drawn.
Now suppose that, at the same domestic prices, production in state a lies
on the line YbE. Then consumption would lie on XbE, and this point would be
optimal (satisfy (1)) for the import vector zb.In this case the marginal— 12—
rateof subtitution would not change across states of nature, so the right-
most expression in (10) is zero.
Alternatively, suppose that at the original domestic prices production in
state a is a' lying above YbE. In this case we shall say that uncertainty
occurs in the import industry.° For given imports zb consumption would be at
Xa, lying above XbE. To satisfy (1), however, it will generally be optimal to
choose other consumption and production points where the marginal rates of
substitution and transformation are equal.Even after this optimal choice
consumption will lie above XbE. With relatively more of good 2 consumed in
state a than in b, the marginal rate of substitution h2/h1, is lower in state
a.It follows that the right—most expression in (10) is positive. Finally,
with uncertainty occurring in the export industry as shown by Y, X in Figure
2, the right—most expression in (10) would be negative.
Consider the former case where uncertainty occurs in the import industry
at home. In state b the home country suffers both a production and terms of
trade decline, and would receive an income transfer from abroad under complete
markets.This income transfer could be achieved under a full information
trade policy by an export subsidy abroad and equal import tariff at home.
However, if the incentive compatibility constraint (7a) is binding then the
full information policy cannot be used. Instead, with the right—most
expression in (10) positive, the relative price of good 2 abroad will exceed
that at home.This means that the import tariff at home is less than the
subsidy abroad.Thus, less than the full amount of the export subsidy is
captured by the home import tariff. This will ensure that when the good state
a occurs, the home country has no incentive to falsely announce that b has
occurred (i.e. (7a) is satisfied).— 13—
Thisincentive compatible policy is illustrated in Figure 3.First,
consider the equilibrium A3, B3.The home country is giving an income
transfer in state a (compare A0 with A3) and receiving it in state b. If the
state of nature is a then the home consumer receives Ua from either of the
trade bundles A3 or B3. Thus, the home consumer would be indifferent between
announcing the true or false state when state a occurs, so constraints (7) are
satisfied.If it happened that condition (5) for optimal risk sharing were
satisfied at A3, B3, then this equilibrium would be the first—best. It could
be implemented even if information were incomplete.
Suppose, however, that to satisfy (5) the home country must give a
greater transfer in state a and receive more in b, as illustrated by A4, B4.
Now when state a occurs the home consumer would receive Ua from the trade
bundle A4 but higher utility from B4, so constraint (7a) is violated.To
satisfy incentive compatibility, the home consumer could instead receive B4 in
state b. Then the home consumer would again be indifferent between announcing
states a or b and receiving A4 or B4, respectively, when state a occurs. When
state b occurs the home consumer obtains utility of Ub.Note that the
equilibrium B4 has a greater volume of trade than positions such as B3 where
domestic and foreign consumer prices are equal. This is consistent with our
result above that the home tariff is less than the foreign subsidy in state b.
If instead the uncertainty occurs in the export industry and constraint
(7a) is binding, then from (10) the relative price of good 2 abroad is less
than at home in state b.Since the productivity fall in the export industry
is accompanied by a terms of trade gain the direction of income transfer is
ambiguous. If the home county is receiving an income transfer in state b then
its import tariff on good 2 will exceed the foreign subsidy. Alternatively,
if the home country is giving an income transfer then its subsidy on good 1 is— 14—
lessthan the foreign tariff.In each case the trade volume would shrink
below that achieved with equal consumer prices across countries.
Suniniing up, we have found that the only incentive compatibility
constraint which may be violated in the first—best is (7a):when the good
state a occurs, the home consumer may prefer to announce that state b
occurred.It is possible to design policies which avoid this problem, but
they have the feature that in state b consumer prices are not equalized across
countries. This distortion is optimal given the incomplete information. The
exact relation between consumer prices, and the corresponding trade policies,
are sensitive to the industry affected by the uncertainty.In state a
equality of consumer prices across countries is maintained.
VI. Direction for Research
The result that the incentive compatible trade policies are sensitive to
the industry affected by the uncertainty is disappointing from a policy view-
point. In practice, it may be difficult to identify the source of uncertainty
and design corresponding trade policies.In this section we will argue that
in a inultiperiod game between the countries simpler policies may be available
to maximize welfare.Our results are meant to be suggestive rather than
conclusive.
Recall from section III that with full information trade policy the
expected value of revenue spent or collected is zero.Consider our model
repeated over many periods, and suppose that over this time horizon the
countries agree that the revenue spent or collected must sum to zero
exactly.For simplicity suppose that each state is equally likely to occur
and that uncertainty affects the import industry.— 15—
Inthis setting if the home country ever falsely announces that state b
has occurred, there by receiving rather than giving an income transfer, this
will raise its "net indebtedness" as measured by revenue collected.To
achieve zero net revenue at the end of the game the home country may have to
forfeit an income transfer, i.e. announce state a, even when state b occurs.
Thus, it appears that the incentive to falsely announce the bad state and
receive an income transfer will be moderated by its effect on revenue
collected, and the subsequent need to transfer income abroad. The critical
element in the choice of which state to announce is the probability that
after one false announcement is made (to receive income), another false
announcement (giving income) must be made later in the game to achieve zero
net revenue.
We would generally expect that< 1, but let us consider the case
=1.11If the home consumer falsely announces that state b occurs, a
welfare gain of U[h(zb,a)] —U[h(za,a)]is obtained.If a false announcement
of state a must be made later, a welfare loss of U[h(zb,b)1 —U[h(zab)]is
obtained. This set of two false annoucements will be taken by the consumer if
and only if,
U[h(zb,a)] —U[h(z,afl > U[h(zb,b)] —U[h(zab)]
, (ha)
or rewriting,
U[h(zb,a)] +U[h(Zab)]> U[h(za,a)] +U[h(zb,b)]
. (hib)
Note that whether the home country makes both false announcements or not, the
utility obtained by the foreign country in those two periods would be
unchanged at U*[h*(_za)] +U*[h*(_zb)].— 16—
Weassert that in the first—best equilibrium (11) could never hold. The
reason is that the right side of (lib) is the maximized value of expected
utility with equally probable states, while the left side of (llb) is a
feasible choice of trade bundles for the home consumer. Thus, in the first—
best equilibrium the right side of (llb) must exceed the left.It follows
that the home consumer would never wish to make the two false announcements.
This means that the first—best equilibrium would always be incentive compat-
ible. Such a strong result is obtained under the artificial assumption that
=1.More generally, with 0 < a < 1 in a multi—period model, we could
expect that the first—best equilibrium is more likely to be Incentive compat-
ible than in the one—period model considered in this paper. Establishing such
a result appears to be a useful area for further research.— 17—
Footnotes
1. We also assume that the feasible production set in the bad state of nature
is contained within the feasible set in the good state.This assumption is
needed to ensure that it is feasible for the home country to falsely announce
that the bad state has occurred.
2. By assuming ex—post production decisions and a single consumer in each
country we ensure that there is no need for contingent markets under autarky,
in contrast to Newbery and Stiglitz (1982), Eaton and Grossman (1984) and
Staiger and Tabellini (1986).
3. From (3) and (4) we have (A) h1(z5,s)/h2(z5,s) =h(—z5)/h(—z5),and (B)
Uhi(za,a)/Uhi(zb,b) =U*h(_za)/U*h(_zb)•(A) implies that g1(x)/g2(x5)
* * . = g1(x5)/g2(x5).Since g is homogenous of degree one its first derivatives
** canbe written as functions of the ratios x1/x2 and x1/x25.It follows
that these ratios are equal and, therefore, g(x5) =g(x)for i =1,2and
-*-* s=a,b.From (B) we have that U g(x)IU gj(x) =Ugj(x)/U* g(x), and
so (5) follows.
4. Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) argue that optimality in the model of Helpman
and Razin (1978) depends on the multiplicative production uncertainty which is
used.
5. Article XIX of the GATT states that if one country withdraws tariff
concessions then the affected parties may withdraw "substantially equivalent
concessions" (sec. 3.(a)), though It is unclear how the equivalence is to be
judged.
6. An analogous result for labor contracts is obtained by Azariadis (1983,
sec. II), when the firm is risk neutral. That result depends on consumption
and leisure being perfect substitutes for the worker.— 18—
7.If the productivity shock helps one industry but harms the other, then
label state a as the state where both countries have utility greater than or
equal to state b, in the complete markets equilibrium. Recall that from (5)
the utility levels of the countries must be positively correlated.
8. An analogous result for labor contracts in obtained By Azariadis (1983,
sec. V) and Holmstrom and Hart (1985, sec. 4.3).That result is sensitive,
however, to the relative risk aversion of firms and workers; see Azariadis and
Stlglitz (1983, sec. V).
9. The Lagrangian is L =ir5U[h(z,s)]+O{—U[h(zb,a)]+U[h(za,a)1}+4{_U* +
U*[h*(_z5)]}.
10.Findlay and Grubert (1959) analyse the types of production uncertainty
which lead to output changes biased towards one good or the other.
11. Note that since we have assumed the states are equally probable, from (6)
the revenue spent in one state would equal the revenue collected in the
other. Thus, making two false announcements as we consider below would offset
each other in their effect on net revenue.— 19—
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